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Past research by J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence Summers provided
evidence that a robust statistical relationship exists between private
sector investment in plant and equipment and productivity. Private
sector investment in plant and equipment can there f o re be consid-
ered an engine of economic growth. In this issue of the Public Policy
B r i e f S h a ron J. Ere n b u rg argues that there is also a connection
between public spending and economic growth by showing that pub-
lic investment in infrastructure stimulates private sector investment
in plant and equipment. In doing so she provides empirical proof that
public and private investment are complements in prod u c t i o n .
Erenburg’s findings, therefore, serve as the missing link that explicitly
ties public infrastructure to economic growth.
Erenburg’s research is key in the debate over whether the public sec-
tor should play an active role (for example, through incentives) or be
a passive spectator in encouraging private sector investment.
R e s e a rch and policy proposals advocating direct public spending
focus on the benefits derived from certain types of expenditure s ,
n a m e l y, those that would increase U.S. productivity or pro v i d e
investment incentives to the private sector. Public sector capital
could, in theory, make private sector operations more efficient, even
stimulating new private sector investment. On the other hand, critics
of public investment charge that both sectors would be competing for
the same pool of resources, and an increase in public capital spending
would reduce the level of private sector investment, an outcome
called the “crowding out” effect.
Erenburg’s research attempts to find whether crowding out exists and,
if so, whether it is outweighed by any positive effect of public spend-
ing (that is, any “crowding in” effect). Her empirical results for the
s h o rt run show that the net effect (crowding out less crowding in
effects) of each 1.0 percentage point increase in public infrastructure
spending would be an estimated 0.6 percentage point increase in pri-
vate sector equipment investment per year. Long-run estimates indi-
cate that a 1.0 percentage point increase in infrastructure investment
would result in an estimated 0.4 percentage point annual increase in
PPB No.14 Final   2/17/99  1:53 PM  Page 3private equipment investment. Erenburg’s forecast reveals that if the
average annual rate of growth of the public capital stock experienced
between 1947 and 1966 had continued between 1967 and 1990, the
growth rate of private sector equipment investment would have been
4.0 to 6.0 percentage points higher than the actual growth rate.
Applying these potential gains in private sector investment,
E re n b u rg states that annual growth rates of gross domestic prod u c t
(GDP) could have been 1.3 to 1.9 percentage points higher, produc-
tivity 2.4 to 2.9 percentage points higher, and real wages 2.0 to 2.8
percentage points higher than they actually were.
In addition, by confirming the connection between public capital
and the real wage, Erenburg also shows that the lack of public infra-
s t ru c t u re investment during the last 15 to 20 years has adversely
affected the level of real wages in the United States. She first verifies
the existence of a statistical relationship between public capital and
productivity in both the short and long run and then concludes that
stagnant productivity levels in the past can be considered a function
of the lack of public investment. Since productivity directly aff e c t s
wage levels, the decline in productivity resulting from too low a level
of public infrastru c t u re investment has contributed to a decline in
real wages and, therefore, a reduction in earnings.
If it is true, as critics of public investment allege, that crowding out
exists, then it is important from a policy standpoint to determine if
these effects are exceeded by any crowding in effects. Ere n b u rg ’s
re s e a rch confirms that in both the short and long run the positive
effects of adding to the public capital stock are greater than any nega-
tive effects of crowding out. Hence, these results suggest that appro-
priate decisions about the magnitude, nature, and timing of public
investment can make a positive contribution to the level of re a l
wages in the United States. 
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stabilizer in the current atmosphere of bud-
get restraint, the question arises as to what
type of spending might achieve given eco-
nomic and social goals. If the goal is to bol-
ster growth through additions to private
sector investment, one possible answer to
the question is a program of public invest-
ment.
In this issue of the Public Policy Brief,
Research Associate Sharon J. Erenburg
demonstrates that public and private
investment (specifically, public capital
spending and private equipment invest-
ment) are complementary, meaning that an
increase in public investment will lead to a
rise in private investment in equipment.
Since private equipment investment has
been shown to raise private sector produc-
tivity, then fiscal policy could be used to
stimulate such productivity.
By empirically confirming the relationship
between public and private investment,
Erenburg refutes the argument that public
investment limits, or “crowds out,” private
investment by drawing from the pool of
funds available for all types of investment
in the economy. Her estimates show that
the crowding out effect is smaller than the
P re f a c e
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“crowding in” effect; in other words, the stimulating effects of public
investment on private investment are larger than any limiting effects.
Finally, Erenburg asserts that past low levels of public investment have
limited earnings growth and stunted U.S. living standards. She substan-
tiates this claim by confirming both short- and long-run relationships
between public capital spending and productivity. Erenburg uses this
relationship to serve as the core of her argument that past productivity
declines were a function of the lack of public investment. Consequently,
since wages are a function of productivity, stagnant levels of public
investment have contributed to flat wage growth and the relative
decline in U.S. earnings.
A recent surge in private investment, particularly in equipment spend-
ing, has been one of the bright spots in the economy and has contributed
to robust productivity growth over the past 18 months. According to the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, private sector equipment investment has
increased 16 percent since the first quarter of 1993.
The surge in equipment spending does not, however, lessen the merits of
a program of public investment aimed at enhancing America’s long-term
competitiveness. A good deal of the boost in equipment investment can
be attributed to pent-up demand following a lingering recession during
which private fixed investment as a share of GDP had hit a postwar low.
Indeed, even as gross private fixed investment as a share of GDP has
climbed above 14 percent, this level is still at the low end of the postwar
range. According to David A. Levy, director of the Institute’s
Forecasting Center, it would be a flawed inference to conclude from the
recent data on equipment investment that the U.S. economy is currently
in a period of widespread business expansion. In a climate of slow growth
and intense global competition, firms are reluctant to take on major
capacity expansion projects that would require building new factories
and hiring additional workers.
While current public discourse is rightfully focused on fiscal responsibil-
ity and reducing wasteful spending in government, Erenburg’s research
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The Missing Link
Between Investment
and Economic Gro w t h
I.  Introduction
One of the primary measures by which a
country is judged is its ability to provide a
high and rising standard of living for its
population relative to other countries. A
rising standard of living—accompanied by
i n c reases in new businesses, employment
o p p o rtunities, and real wages—is sup-
p o rted by economic growth. The prime
components of economic growth are the
capital stock (and the technology embod-
ied therein) and the labor force.
In a mod e rn, capitalist economy private
sector investment, which consists of firms’
e x p e n d i t u res on plant and equipment, is
vitally important because it adds to the
capital stock, thereby providing the physi-
cal ability of an economy to gro w. In
order to stimulate economic growth, pub-
lic policy generally focuses on the need
for the private sector to increase its pur-
chases of plant and equipment. Such an
addition to the capital stock boosts eco-
nomic growth, prod u c t i v i t y, and re a l
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
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growth after World War II as the result of a rise in private investment
activity; as the capital stock increased, higher productivity levels and
gains in real hourly wages led to a rise in living standards.
Economic policy, therefore, is regularly employed as an instrument to
improve our standard of living. The identification and development
of effective policies are difficult, however, because these tasks require
a clear and accurate understanding of the complex economic re l a-
tionships that underlie economic growth. Any attempt to develop
policies aimed at stimulating economic growth assumes not only that
policymakers understand these complex relationships, but more
i m p o rt a n t l y, that implementing public spending programs for the
government provision of goods and services in a mixed capitalist sys-
tem is beneficial.
To undertake a rigorous examination of the relationships and to gain
a better understanding of the timing, direction, and magnitude of
public infrastru c t u re investment that would be effective, this paper
separates the effects of the stock and flow of public capital. A change
in the level of public infrastru c t u re spending could, for example,
have a short- or long-run negative effect on private investment if
both sectors are competing for the same pool of re s o u rces. An
increase in public capital spending might reduce the level of private
sector investment, the so-called crowding out effect. Much to the
chagrin of laissez-faire proponents, this re s e a rch confirms that, in
both the short and long run, the positive effect of public capital
investment exceeds any negative effect of crowding out. 
These findings have particular significance in light of pre v i o u s
research (such as that by DeLong and Summers) that showed a sig-
nificant and positive correlation between increases in private sector
equipment investment and GDP growth rates. By revealing a strong
relationship between public capital and private equipment invest-
ment, these results serve as the missing link in demonstrating a clear,
empirical relationship between public infrastructure investment and
private sector productivity. 
Linking Public Capital to Economic Performance 
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ment, and aggregate prod u c t i v i t y, the findings also indicate a re l a-
tionship (through the productivity gain) between public capital and
real wages. Therefore, not only has the decline in public infrastruc-
t u re investment contributed to the deterioration of aggregate eco-
nomic measures, it has also contributed to the relative stagnation of
real wages and living standards in the United States over the past
two decades.
II.  The Role of Public Goods in a Capitalist System
During the 1980s limiting government involvement in the U.S.
economy was viewed as an important pre requisite for economic
growth. It was thought that reducing government involvement would
encourage economic efficiency and private investment spending.
The problem with this idea is best expressed as a “fallacy of limited
decisions.” The idea assumes that the number of decisions made in a
market economy is fixed and that decreasing the number of decisions
made by the government necessarily increases the number of deci-
sions made by the private sector. It also assumes that govern m e n t
decisions are inherently inefficient, so the fewer the number of gov-
ernment decisions (or the greater the number of private sector deci-
sions), the greater the economic efficiency and, therefore, the greater
the productivity in the aggregate economy. 
An efficient market economy, however, produces not only private
goods, but public goods. The fallacy in the reasoning is that it ignores
the fact that the government provides public goods. Once the pro-
duction of these goods is taken into consideration, the assumption
about the inefficiency of government decisions no longer holds.
Private goods are goods that are produced for individual consump-
tion, and only the consumers who pay for the goods benefit. When a
consumer buys a car, for example, he or she pays for the car and
receives all of the benefits of owning that car. Public goods, however,
are goods that cannot be broken down into units small enough to be
Public Capital 
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pay for that good. A classic example of a pure public good would be
national defense, as it is available for all members of the population
to “consume” whether or not they pay for it. Since national defense
cannot be furnished in units small enough for individual consump-
tion and nonpaying consumers cannot be prevented from benefiting
from it, it is not profitable to provide this good, and so the private
sector will not do so. The government can provide national defense
because it has the power of taxation; that is, it has the power to tax
the total population (the aggregate that benefits from the presence of
national defense), thereby compelling all to pay for the good. This is
an example of private market failure in that the private market fails
to produce a good (in this case, a pure public good) in the optimal
amount.
In addition, decisions made by private markets alone will not ensure
an efficient use of re s o u rces when production is characterized by
d e c reasing costs (when cost per unit declines as output incre a s e s ) .
This decline occurs in the case of a natural monopoly. If there is
more than one firm in this type of market, aggregate industry output
will be produced at a higher cost than if it were produced by a single
f i rm, which clearly is an inefficient and costly use of re s o u rc e s .
However, if, in order to capture economies of scale, a single, unregu-
lated firm is allowed to exist, that firm is likely, because of the lack of
competition, to furnish a level of output that is below the socially
optimal amount at a correspondingly higher-than-optimal price. This
is also an inefficient allocation of resources. The private market will
fail to provide any adjustment toward the optimal level of output, a
competitive price, or a more efficient use of re s o u rces. When the
g o v e rnment produces or regulates the production of such goods or
services, a more efficient use of existing resources will result than if
the private market works independently. If a good or service can be
p roduced at a lower cost through government provision or re g u l a-
tion, then total available resources in the economy at any point in
time will be used more eff i c i e n t l y, and this increase in eff i c i e n c y
enhances productivity.
Linking Public Capital to Economic Performance 
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and fiber-optic communication networks, are examples of these types
of goods. They are classified as near-public goods because they are
jointly consumed, even though nonpaying users can be excluded. A
more efficient use of existing resources occurs when the government
p rovides infrastru c t u re because costly duplication of re s o u rces is
avoided and economies of scale are exploited.
In response to private market failure, then, the government takes
responsibility for the provision of certain goods by contracting with
the private sector. In doing so, the government plays a significant
role in facilitating a more efficient movement of goods, people, ser-
vices, and information.
Identifying that portion of government spending re p resenting the
purchase of public capital is important as it directly affects the pro-
ductivity of the private capital stock. For example, private businesses
need a modern, well-maintained network of highways, sewer systems,
mass transit, and so forth. They would operate much less efficiently if
this network were not publicly provided, and attempts by them to
p rovide their own networks would also result in duplication and
waste of scarce economic resources. Indeed, when a good or service is
p rovided by government, it affects firms’ individual cost functions.
When a private firm utilizes a publicly provided and maintained
highway system to receive and ship its products, the productivity of
that firm rises because it combines its own capital with public capital,
t h e reby cutting the cost per unit of output. The more efficient the
highway system, the less the transportation time and the greater the
decline in input costs. This effect is easily seen in the dramatic reduc-
tion in shipping time and costs that occurred when the system of
roads that existed prior to the 1950s was replaced by the mod e rn
interstate highway system.
The reduction in supply costs is true at the firm level and in the aggre-
gate as total output per unit of input increases when govern m e n t - p ro-
vided infrastru c t u re results in a more efficient use of existing
re s o u rces. Unfort u n a t e l y, it is precisely on this point that the critics of
mixed capitalism become confused: While there is merit to their arg u-
Public Capital 
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user fees composed of tariffs and tolls) will make better use of the
existing infrastru c t u re, it addresses only the issue of the best way to
price the use of existing infrastru c t u re, not the question of the best
way to provide additional public capital or to renovate the existing
i n f r a s t ru c t u re. More import a n t l y, such an argument cannot be used to
s u p p o rt the claim that infrastru c t u re should be provided by the private
s e c t o r, as it ignores the nature of social goods and private market fail-
u re and, there f o re, bypasses the pivotal aggregate issues of decre a s i n g
costs, externalities, and re s o u rce reallocation. For example, the arg u-
ment that private firms are most efficient in a competitive market is
i rrelevant if the market is a natural monopoly. The underlying
assumption that other firms will provide the same goods or serv i c e s
and thus furnish the competition necessary to break up monopoly
c o n t rol is both false and naive. To claim without quantification that
the private sector can better provide infrastru c t u re because the pro f i t
motive encourages private firms to cut costs and use re s o u rces more
e fficiently ignores the fact that many private sector firms themselves
a re characterized by waste, poor management, and ineff i c i e n c y. The
positive effects exerted by public capital on productivity and, there-
f o re, on private investment activity is indeed a separate issue.
III.  Private Investment, Public Investment, and 
Economic Growth
A. A Review of Existing Research
Infrastructure, economic growth, and productivity all determine our
competitive position in the international economy. As documented
by DeLong and Summers (1991), private business investment expen-
ditures, particularly on plant and equipment, are a strategic factor in
economic growth. Using data from the United Nations Comparison
Project and the Penn World Tables, they found a much stronger link
between private investment in equipment and economic gro w t h
than any other components of private investment. They asserted that
the relationship is causal, that is, that higher equipment investment
drives faster growth, not vice versa. They argued that “In neoclassical
Linking Public Capital to Economic Performance 
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rates. However, investment rates may influence growth rates as shifts
in investment rates cause economies to transit between steady-state
g rowth paths.” Testing this premise, they found that for the years
1960 to 1985, each extra percentage point of GDP invested in equip-
ment was associated with an increase in aggregate annual GDP
growth of one-third of a percentage point. The association was much
stronger than between growth and any other investment component.
In addition, Jorgenson (1988, 1990), using U.S. data, demonstrated a
strong correlation between private equipment investment and total
factor productivity growth, and Helliwell (1993) found investment
in physical capital a critical source of Asian growth, statistically more
important than even education. 
The relationship between changes in total government spending and
changes in aggregates (such as growth, employment, and inflation)
has been the subject of many theoretical and empirical studies. Work
such as that by David Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) has once again stim-
ulated interest in the connection between government spending on
public capital and various measures of aggregate economic activity. 
Many of the empirical studies of the effect of infrastru c t u re invest-
ment on aggregate variables focus on the relationship between gov-
ernment spending on the core infrastructure and economic growth at
national, regional, and state levels. The statistical results of these
analyses have, however, been mixed. For example, studies by
Aschauer (1989a), Eberts (1986), and Munnell (1990) indicated a
statistically significant, positive relationship between public invest-
ment and growth. The estimates of the elasticity of output with
respect to public infrastructure capital and economic growth varied
w i d e l y, with the re p o rted elasticities in studies that used national
time series data being larger than in studies that used state data. This
difference may be due to the fact that the state and regional studies
may have attempted to measure productivity effects using a geo-
graphic area too small to register all of the external benefits emanat-
ing from public infrastructure capital. In essence, although the pre-
cise size of the correlation between public infrastru c t u re and
p roductivity may be in dispute, there appears to be near consensus
that a significant correlation does exist.1
Public Capital 
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Schwartz (1992), and Nadiri and Mamuneas (1991), have examined
the relationship between public capital and the costs of private pro-
duction and found that investment in public capital resulted in a sig-
nificant reduction in private sector costs. Lynde and Richmond
(1992) indicated that private and public capital are complements in
production and that public capital has a positive marginal product. A
study by Lynde (1993) established a direct relationship among public
capital, productivity, and profits.
The idea that infrastructure capital affects private investment activ-
ity and economic growth is discussed by Buiter (1977). He asserted
that a complementary relationship between public and private
investment was obvious, citing as examples public investment in pro-
jects such as dam construction and highways. As Munnell (1992) has
argued, “everyone agrees that public capital investment can expand
the productive capacity of an area, both by increasing resources and
by enhancing the productivity of existing resources.”
F i n a l l y, Aschauer (1989b) and Ere n b u rg (1993a) found a positive
c o rrelation at the aggregate level between the provision of public
i n f r a s t ru c t u re and private investment activity. Ere n b u rg ’s (1993b)
re s e a rch, utilizing the major private investment models, found a
direct relationship between private investment activity and the gov-
ernment’s provision of nonmilitary public capital. 
B. The Historical Record of Private and Public Investment
When conducting any historical analysis of economic data, it obvi-
ously must be kept in mind that the structural characteristics of the
m a c roeconomy today are dramatically diff e rent from those of the
1920s, the global depression of the 1930s, and certainly the war years
of the 1940s. Much of public investment in the 1940s involved the
p roduction of war goods. During that period government spending as a
p e rcentage of gross national product (GNP) peaked at 49 perc e n t ,
much of which was expenditure on public capital. As a result of this
massive spending program, and the fact that the nation was operating
at full employment, private investment was restricted until the peace
time conversion from war goods to consumer goods production. (Some 
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e v e r, became part of the private capital stock after the war ended.)
As shown in Figures 1 and 3, the growth of the public capital stock has
not kept pace with the growth in the private capital stock. Private net
fixed investment as a share of GDP also has declined (see Figure 2).
The relationship between private investment and economic gro w t h
has clear policy implications if private investment decisions are
a ffected by the provision of the public capital stock: If public infra-
s t ru c t u re directly affects private investment in plant and equipment
decisions, the slowdown in the growth of the govern m e n t ’s pro v i s i o n
of public infrastru c t u re may account for the recent decline in private 
Public Capital 
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Figure 1  Public Capital–to–Private Capital Stock Ratio, 1947–1990  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992).
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ductivity of the U.S. economy. 
F rom 1947 through 1990 there was a dramatic decline in the ratio of
the public capital stock to the private capital stock (refer again to
F i g u re 1). Between 1967 and 1990 the ratio, on average, would have
been 10 percentage points higher if the growth rate of govern m e n t
i n f r a s t ru c t u re had remained at its 1947 to 1966 average; this assert i o n
is illustrated in Figure 3, which compares the actual public capital
stock (in constant dollars) to estimates of what the public capital stock
would have been if the historic rate of growth had been maintained.
All else constant, the adjustment depicted in the two figures implies
that if the rate of growth of the public capital stock had remained the 
Linking Public Capital to Economic Performance 
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Figure 2  Net Private Investment as a Share of GDP, 1947–1990
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992).
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investment also would have grown at a faster rate. (This point is dis-
cussed further in the following section.)
C. The Role of Public Investment in Stimulating Economic Growth
S t a n d a rd private investment models in the current literature have,
for the most part, ignored the possible effect of public capital on pri-
vate investment decisions. If the provision of public infrastru c t u re
capital increases the productivity of private capital and the profitabil-
ity of private investment, then the effect of government spending on
public capital should be modeled separately in order to capture such
Public Capital 
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
Figure 3  Private and Public Capital Stocks, 1947–1990 (actual and adjusted)
S o u r c e : Author’s calculations based on Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992).
PPB No.14 Final   2/17/99  1:53 PM  Page 19effects. If both the public and private sectors are competing for the
same re s o u rces for private and public investment projects, curre n t
public investment spending could result in a decline in private
investment spending, the crowding out effect. At the same time, the
existing public capital stock, used as an input, may crowd in private
investment spending. Modeling private investment decisions in this
manner is an attempt to determine both how and to what extent pri-
vate investment decisions are affected by public infrastructure deci-
sions. Accord i n g l y, these private investment models also include
public sector investment spending and public capital stock variables.
In this study the public capital stock and government investment
spending were incorporated into the major investment models. (For a
technical discussion of the models used, see Appendix A.) The find-
ings reveal a stronger relationship between private investment in
equipment and the public capital stock and government spending
than any other components of private investment. The statistical
outcomes of these models resulted in rejecting the hypothesis that
the government’s provision of public infrastructure has no economic
effect, a statistical correlation that was confirmed in both the short
run and the long run. (See Appendix A for the empirical results.)
Herein lies the key to understanding part of the complex economic
relationships that drive economic growth. Because government’s pro-
vision of public capital stimulates private equipment investment, pol-
icy can be formulated to stimulate such growth. The importance of
these links is obvious when combined with the strong association
found by DeLong and Summers (1991) between equipment invest-
ment and growth discussed earlier. Applying their estimates of the
e ffect of increased equipment investment on GDP growth to the
United States, higher public capital investment would have elevated
private sector equipment investment by 0.4 to 0.6 percentage point,
which translates to an increase in GDP growth of between 0.125 to
0.2 percentage point per year. Increasing public infrastructure by 10.0
percentage points (a figure based on the historic average) would have
swelled private sector equipment investment by between 4.0 to 6.0
percentage points; applying DeLong and Summer’s estimates to these
f i g u res yields an increase in annual GDP growth of 1.3 to 1.9 per-
centage points above their actual rates.
Linking Public Capital to Economic Performance 
Public Policy Brief 20
PPB No.14 Final   2/17/99  1:53 PM  Page 20This assertion is borne out by the findings of this study, specifically
the calculations included in Table 1, which compare recent public
and private investment spending to the high-growth period experi-
enced in the United States from 1947 to 1966. What is striking
about the ratios is that they all indicate a decline in public invest-
ment relative to the public capital stock, the private capital stock,
and total government spending.
For example, government spending on infrastructure has decreased as
a percentage of total government spending at all levels of govern-
ment, and infrastructure expenditures have declined as a share of the
private capital stock and GNP. As a result, today there exist smaller
stocks of both public and private capital than would have existed had
annual government expenditures on infrastru c t u re been larg e r.
Specifically, if the historic ratio of public investment to public capital
(10 percent) had been maintained through 1990, average total gov-
ernment investment spending would have been $233 billion in 1990
rather than the actual $155 billion; this represents a shortfall to the
public capital stock in that year alone of $78.7 billion (see Table 1).
In 1990 our public capital stock was $662 billion below its historical
average when comparing the public capital stock to private capital
stock. 
Furthermore, spending on public and private investment relative to
the private capital stock has been decreasing since 1967. Public
investment spending has decreased from 10 percent during the 1947
to 1966 period to 7 percent during the 1967 to 1990 period when
c o m p a red to the growth rate of the public capital stock. We have
been below the historic growth average since 1967. Figure 4 shows
the actual and adjusted public investment–to–public capital stock
ratios over time, after increasing the public capital stock and public
investment spending rate to their historic growth rates (so that the
public investment–to–public capital stock ratio is equal to its historic
average of 10 percent).
In terms of annual public investment spending, the United States
was $120 billion below its historic ratio of public investment spend-
ing to the private capital stock. In addition, private investment
expenditures grew at less than the historic rate, falling $66.7 billion 
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rate of spending growth had been maintained. The estimates show
that if the public capital stock had remained at its 1947 to 1966 pace
(rather than declining), productivity would have been 2.4 to 2.9 per-
centage points higher and real wages 2.0 to 2.8 percentage points
h i g h e r. These projections translate into a potential increase in per
capita GDP and a higher, rather than stagnating, standard of living.
Indeed, recent research by Erenburg (1993c) supports the hypothesis
of a direct relationship between private equipment investment and
public infrastru c t u re, while finding no statistical evidence that 
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Figure 4  Public Investment–to–Public Capital Stock Ratio, 1947–1990 
(actual and adjusted)
Source: Author’s calculations based on Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992).
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investment. Additionally, research by DeLong and Summers (1991)
supports a causal relationship between private investment in equip-
ment and economic growth, with no evidence of reverse causation.
H o w e v e r, critics, such as Holtz-Eakin (1993), of a similar study by
Aschauer (1989a) raised a question re g a rding the possibility of a
problem of spurious correlation.2 One way to deal with this problem
is to difference the data so that it is in a stationary form. Differencing
the data, though, to eliminate the possibility of spurious correlation,
while yielding short - run relationships, precludes the possibility of
examining any long-term relationship between private and public
investment. As Munnell (1992) has suggested, “re s e a rchers should
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Table 1





Ratios 1947–66 1967–90 1990 (billions of 1987 dollars)
Public capital–to– .58 .48 .44 $2,089 $2,750 ($662.0)
private capital
Public investment–to– .10 .066 .07 155 213 (58.5)
public capital
Public investment–to– 155 233 (78.7)
public capital (historical)
Public investment–to– .06 .03 .03 155 275 (120.0)
private capital
Private investment–to– .12 .11 .10 502 569 (66.7)
private capital
Public investment–to– .21 .16 .14 155 195 (40.7)
total government spending
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992 and personal communication); Citibase.
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extent to which they are non-stationary, but also whether they grow
together over time and converge to their long-run relationship, that
is, the extent to which they are co-integrated” (p. 192). In order to
respond to this suggestion, in this study long-run as well as short-run
relationships were statistically examined by the 1989 Stock-Watson
method.
IV.  The Relationship Among Infrastructure, Economic 
Growth, and the Real Wage
The re s e a rch discussed thus far establishes a statistical re l a t i o n s h i p
between public infrastru c t u re and private investment behavior.
Erenburg (1993c) has also examined the relationship among public
i n f r a s t ru c t u re, the real wage, and productivity in the United States
using measures of the effects of both public and private capital on
productivity. 
Both neoclassical and Keynesian theories predict that real wages rise
with technical progress and expansions in the capital stock and move
inversely over the course of the business cycle. Empirical studies have
not confirmed whether real wages are cyclical or counterc y c l i c a l .
Although models include changes in the capital stock when measur-
ing changes in productivity, the effects of productivity changes have
been limited to those induced by changes in the private capital stock.
For example, Canzoneri’s re s e a rch indicates that “real [Canadian]
wages are strongly counter-cyclical when the level of the [private]
capital stock is controlled for” (Canzoneri 1978, pp. 20–21). Recent
work by Aschauer (1989a, 1989b), Ere n b u rg (1993a, 1993b),
Munnell (1990), and Lynde and Richmond (1992) has shown that
both the public capital stock and the private capital stock are corre-
lated with various measures of economic activity such as output, pri-
vate investment, and productivity growth. Aschauer’s empirical esti-
mates show a strong positive relationship between output per unit of
private capital and the public capital–to–private capital stock ratio,
with the coefficients of the labor-to-capital ratio and the public capi-
tal–to–private capital stock ratio both positive and significant.3
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on the costs of private production. Lynde and Richmond (1992) have
found that the marginal productivity of public capital is positive, sug-
gesting that public and private capital are complements in prod u c-
tion. In their examination of the relationship between public capital
and the costs of private production, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1991)
found, among other results, a statistically significant contribution of
public capital to labor productivity.4
If the real wage is a function of prod u c t i v i t y, then a decline
(increase) in productivity will be associated with a decline (increase)
in real wages. The data indicate that, when controlling for the capi-
tal stock, real wages are countercyclical. (See Appendix B for a
description of the statistical models used and the resulting empirical
findings.) In addition, estimates from the real wage equation indicate
that a long-run relationship exists between real wages and labor pro-
ductivity and the public capital–to–private capital ratio.5
V. Conclusions
Overall, these results confirm a statistical relationship between pub-
lic capital and productivity in the United States, while addre s s i n g
the problem of spurious correlation. These results also add to the sta-
tistical evidence cited by Aschauer (1989a) and Ere n b u rg (1993c)
that public capital directly affects not only productivity and private
investment decisions, but also real wages via productivity effects.
These results also can be applied to our pursuit of a competitive position
in the global economy. As Joseph P. Quinlan (1993) stressed in an edi-
torial in The Wall Street Journ a l c o n c e rning Southeast Asian markets:
To tap these burgeoning markets, U.S. companies should carefully
assess . . . infrastructure. Severe infrastructure limitations have raised
the cost of operating in Asia, prompting some multinationals to
invest elsewhere. Following five years of strong growth, the physical
infrastructure of the region is straining at the seams—the roads are
crowded, the ports are clogged and the airports are jammed. Pollution
and environmental degradation compound matters. The upshot is
infrastructure gridlock, which threatens not only to strangle growth
and trade, but also to curtail new foreign investment. (p. A10)
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the most profitable environment. It becomes mandatory, then, for
the United States to provide an up-to-date, well-functioning infra-
structure in order to continue to attract new foreign capital.
The public policy implications of this re s e a rch are obvious: If the
decline in public capital spending has contributed to the dip in U.S.
p roductivity during the last two decades, then the decline has also
contributed to the lack of real wage growth—a prime determinant of
living standards—during the same period. 
Mounting statistical evidence supports the contention that public
infrastructure has a positive effect on economic growth, private sec-
tor equipment investment, and real wages. The strength of these
conclusions is derived from the evidence that the effects of public
capital are felt not just in the short run, but in the long run as well. 
It is incorrect to argue that infrastructure has negligible productivity
effects, that public investment crowds out private investment, or that
the government provision of public capital is inefficient. Transferring
$1 of investment from the private to the public sector does not result
in an analogous decline in productive private investment with no
c o rresponding benefits. The argument that policies to increase pri-
vate sector investment have a better chance to improve U.S. com-
petitiveness is incomplete because it ignores the stimulative effect of
public infrastructure on private investment and disregards the effects
of efficiency gains from public goods. 
It is not a matter of choosing either one type of investment or the
o t h e r. Rather, there are benefits to be derived from both types.
Indeed, the findings suggest a complementary relationship between
public and private investment, with additions to public capital acting
as a catalyst for private equipment spending. Armed with an under-
standing of the links between public infrastructure and private equip-
ment investment and economic growth, cost-benefit studies should
be used to determine what magnitude, nature, and timing of infra-
structure projects would yield the most economic benefits in terms of
geographic area and concomitant user needs.
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levels prevalent in the period following World War II. However, the
need for long-run planning should not be taken as a reason to neglect
infrastructure investment in the short run. When spending on public
infrastructure is increased, assets are created in both the private and
public sectors, and these assets stimulate national economic growth.
This type of public policy, based on providing public infrastructure, is
ideal in the sense that additional expenditures on infrastructure have
positive effects in both the short run and long run: In the short run
they provide employment through the private sector by stimulating
the construction industry; in the long run they stimulate private
investment in the United States, thereby enhancing productivity and
economic growth.
The domestic policy implications are clear. Neglecting infrastructure
has a deleterious effect on private sector equipment investment, eco-
nomic growth, and living standards. Admittedly, the U.S. economy
has witnessed a recent boost in private equipment investment, with
an accompanying increase in productivity. Much of this recent spurt,
though, is a result of many years of record-low levels of private sector
investment and of obsolescence and depreciation of old equipment.
If the private sector is expected to sustain a healthy pace of equip-
ment investment over the long run, a structural change, namely, a
strong commitment to public infrastructure, must act as a catalyst.
Appendix A 
Estimating the Effects of Public Capital on Private
Investment 
The Models Used in This Study
The private investment models incorporated in this study include the
accelerator–cash flow model, the securities valuation–cash flow
m odel, and the neoclassical investment model. Data from 1952 to
1990 were used for the accelerator and neoclassical investment mod-
els; data from 1960 to 1987 were incorporated in the securities valua-
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public investment and public capital stock data.
The Accelerator–Cash Flow Model
In the accelerator–cash flow model, firms adjust their investment
decisions in response to changes in demand and internal cash flow.
The basic accelerator model is expressed as
(1)  KT d = aY + m KG
where
KT d = desired private capital stock
KG = public capital stock
Y  = output
In this basic model, adjustments to changes in output are not imme-
diate, but rather, take place over a number of time periods. 
Adding a lagged term to represent replacement investment, a public
capital term to represent infrastructure in place (in order to measure
any productivity effect), and dividing through by the private capital




I  = private sector investment
IG = public sector investment
KT = actual private capital stock
u  = error term
Adding cash flow as a measure of available internal funds (versus
e x t e rnal finance) or a profits variable as a measure of future pro f-
itability of a firm (and its concomitant effect on future output) yields
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(3) 
where  
CF = cash flow
The basic concept of the augmented accelerator–cash flow model is
that adjustments occur not only in reaction to changes in output, but
also to changes in public investment spending and public capital. If
the public capital stock increases the productivity of private invest-
ment projects, then private investment activity also should increase.
In order to capture adjustments made over the course of the business
cycle, many empirical studies include the idea of adjustment to
changes in actual output relative to potential output (the “demand
gap”), rather than to changes in output alone. In this study capacity
utilization was used as a measure of the demand gap. In addition, the
ratio of the public capital stock to the private capital stock was
adjusted for the capacity utilization rate.6 The ratio of after-tax prof-
its, adjusted for inventory valuation and capital consumption
allowance, to corporate income (in real terms) was used as the cash
flow variable. Since taxes represent the price firms must pay for the
p rovision of public goods, the effect of taxation was addressed by
using tax-adjusted profits.
The Securities Valuation–Cash Flow Model
The securities valuation investment model differs from many other
investment models (including the two others used in this study) in
that investment is assumed to occur on a financial basis, that is, in
terms of the firm’s portfolio balance and expected profitability. The
key variable in the model is the q ratio, which is the ratio of the mar-
ket value of a firm’s outstanding stocks and bonds to the replacement
cost of a firm’s capital stock. When a firm acts to maximize the value
of shareholder equity, the market value of the firm ’s outstanding
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replacement cost of the capital goods, investment will occur. 
The use of the q ratio in an investment model allows for expected
p ro f i t a b i l i t y. Following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), cash
flow also has been added. Augmenting the securities valuation–cash
flow model with public capital yields a public capital augmented
securities valuation–cash flow model:
(4)  
The q ratio used in this study is a tax-adjusted variable constructed by
McMillin and Parker (1990) for the years 1961 to 1987.
The Neoclassical Investment Model
In the neoclassical model, private investment is determined in part by
the cost of capital and in part by cash flow. Jorgenson (1971) and oth-
ers have developed an investment model using a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, which reflects the neoclassical principle that factor
inputs should be a function of their relative prices. Adding public cap-
ital to the neoclassical expression of desired capital stock yields
(5) 
where 
g =  share of capital in output
p =  output price
C =  cost of capital
Analogous to the adjustment process in the previous investment
m odel, a public capital term is included to re p resent infrastru c t u re
a l ready in place, yielding a public capital augmented neoclassical
investment model:
(6) 
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r k =  nominal rate of return to capital 
r c =  real rate of return to capital
This model includes separate variables for cash flow and the relative
cost of capital, an empirical form based on Jorgenson’s development
of the reduced form of the optimal demand for capital. This form
“allows the demand for capital to be expressed as a function of the
relative cost of capital services alone; the effect of other factor prices
is captured by including the level of output or sales in the model. In
this case, the neoclassical model with partial-adjustment assumptions
takes a form similar to the accelerator model” (Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen 1988). The tax-adjusted profits variable and the ratio of the
return to capital to the cost of capital also are included in this model.
The proxy used for the rate of re t u rn to capital was the price-dividend
ratio of Standard and Poor’s Composite Index; the real rate used was
the 10-year U.S. Tre a s u ry rate adjusted for inflation. This latter mea-
s u re was utilized in order to allow for changes in both the nominal rate
and the real rate of re t u rn to capital.7 If the increase in the nominal
rate of re t u rn to capital is greater than the increase in the cost of capi-
tal (measured by the real rate), private investment should rise. 
Empirical Results
Tables A1, A2, and A3 provide the empirical results of estimating
the relationships between private investment and public investment
spending and the public capital stock using the models described
above. Table A3 includes results for the securities valuation mod e l
o n l y, as that model yielded the best statistical results (in terms of
adjusted R2, statistical significance, and standard errors) compared to
the accelerator and neoclassic models. 
Empirical Analysis
Critics of public investment often ask how public capital affects pri-
vate investment activity. As the industrial sector combines its capital
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value of firms to increase. Consequently, as the expected (future )
value of a firm rises, capital investment expands. In terms of new pri-
vate investment, assuming that firms judge the profitability of an
investment project based on its internal rate of return, the following
benefit-cost expression can be used to examine how the return to pri-
vate investment projects is enhanced by public infrastructure:
(7)  
where
Bj = total benefits associated with investment project j
C  = total costs associated with investment project j
r  = rate of return associated with firm n
There are clear costs and benefits associated with public infrastruc-
ture. Start-up costs are lower when public infrastructure is provided
(for example, improved transportation lowers materials costs). If ben-
efits are greater than costs (that is, the future stream of income of
firms is higher because of infrastructure), then the rate of return to
private investment will be gre a t e r. Simply put, this suggests that
there will be more private investment with infrastructure than with-
out infrastru c t u re. Holding everything else constant, infrastru c t u re
investment increases the net present value of any investment project,
expands private investment activity, and enhances the future growth
of real income, given limited resources.
Using the standard investment models outlined above, a direct rela-
tionship between private investment in equipment and the public
capital stock was found in the short run, with a point estimate of
0.89. At the same time an inverse relationship between private
equipment investment and government investment spending was
found, with a point estimate of –0.30. The latter result may indicate
financial sector crowding out, or it might be that if firms that benefit
from public capital believe that the stock of public infrastructure will
be larger in the future, they may postpone equipment investment to
take advantage of the increase in the expected future rate of return
when the public capital is put in place. 
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mate of 0.59, which indicates that each 1.0 percentage point increase
in public infrastru c t u re and government investment spending was
associated with approximately a 0.6 percentage point rise in private
sector equipment investment per year.
In order to address the problem of spurious re g ression, the Stock-
Watson (1989) estimation method, which also allows for the testing of
l o n g - run relationships, was applied to the data. The results indicate that
a long-run relationship between private sector equipment investment
and public infrastru c t u re and government spending does indeed exist.
The positive effect of the public capital stock on private equipment
investment (0.91) was greater than the negative effect of govern m e n t
investment spending (–0.52); combining these two point estimates
yielded a long-run relationship of 0.39, indicating that each additional
1.0 percentage point increase in public infrastru c t u re and govern m e n t
investment spending is associated with approximately a 0.4 perc e n t a g e
point increase in private sector equipment investment. There was no
evidence of a statistically significant short - run relationship with private
investment in stru c t u res and public infrastru c t u re, but a significant
(0.43 point estimate) long-run relationship was found.
These strong statistical results indicate that, for the time period
examined, public infrastru c t u re had an overall short- and long-ru n
stimulative effect on private equipment investment in the United
States. These results confirm those of Aschauer (1989b) while
addressing concerns of spurious correlation.
Appendix B
Modeling the Relationship Between Public Capital and
the Real Wage
The following aggregate labor demand function, expressed in term s
of the real wage, incorporates the effect of productivity, ft. 
(8)  (W/P)t = G(W/P)t-1, ft)
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where
W/P = real wage
N = aggregate employment of labor
K = private nonresidential capital
G   = public capital
Productivity is measured assuming a generalized Cobb-Douglas form
for the production technology, competitive product and factor mar-
kets, and constant re t u rns to scale across all factors of prod u c t i o n .
This yields the aggregate production function (10) and the produc-
tivity of private capital equation (11).
(10)  Y = A(t)f(N, K, G)
where 
Y = aggregate output
A = technical change
Taking logs and rearranging yields
(11)  yt - kt = at + bn(nt - kt) + bg (gt - kt)
where lower case indicates logs.
The following two equations specify the real wage in terms of produc-
tivity ft (defined as output per unit of capital) as developed in equa-
tion (11) plus a time variable. Business cycle effects are also added to
equation (11) by adding the log of capacity utilization.
(12) (wt - pt) = a0 + a1(wt - pt)t-1 + a2 (yt - kt) + e1,t
(13) (yt - kt) = m0 + m1 t + m2(n1 - k1) + m3(g1- k1) 
+ m4cut + e2,t
40
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Long-Run Estimates of Private Investment in Equipment and Structures (log
levels and D log levels)
Securities  Valuation–Cash Flow
Equipment Structures
Adjusted R2 .88 .75
Constant –4.66* –4.53**
(.69) (1.09)
Profits–to–corporate income ratio  –.06 –.17**
(.06) (.08)
Tobin’s q .15* .03
(.04) (.06)
Public capital–to–private capital stock ratio .91* .43**
(.15) (.21)


















a (+1) and (–1) indicate one lead or lag period, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*   = .01 level of significance.
**  = .05 level of significance.
*** = .10 level of significance.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992 and personal communication); Citibase; McMillin and
Parker (1990).
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a. Estimation of the Real Wage and Labor Productivity Equations (log levels)
Real Wage Equation (14) Productivity Equation (15)
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
Constant .04* Constant –4.97
(.01) (.39)
Time .0016   Time .57*
(.002) (.12)
(n – k) –.29* (n – k) .44*
(.125) (.07)
(g – k) .225* (g – k) .50*
(.076) (.05)
Capacity utilization .09* Capacity utilization .006*
(.04) (.002)
Real wage  .68*
(lagged one period) (.09)
CRS = .98 CRS = .998
Durbin-Watson = 1.07 Durbin-Watson = 1.91
b. Estimation of the Real Wage and Labor Productivity Equations, Adjusted
for Business Cycle Effects (log levels)
Real Wage Equation (14a) Productivity Equation (15a)
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
Constant .51* Constant –6.12
(.17) (.12)
Time .001   Time –.002*
(.001) (.0008)
(n – ka) –.32* (n – k) .21*
(.08) (.04)




CR2 = .96 CR2 = .997
Durbin-Watson = .80 Durbin-Watson = 1.91
Standard errors in parentheses.
*  = .01 level of significance. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992 and personal com-
munication); Citibase.
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a. Estimation of Real Wage and
Labor Productivity Equations as a
Nonlinear System with Constrained
Coefficients
Coefficient Standard Error
g0 = 0.58* (.25)
g1 = 0.67* (.09)
g2 = 0.002 (.002)
g3 = –0.30* (.12)
g4 = 0.23* (.07)
g5 = 0.10* (.04)
m0 = –4.67* (.37)
m1 = 0.006* (.002)
m2 = 0.57* (.11)
m3 = 0.44* (.07)
m4 = 0.09* (.04)
Equation (14): CR2 = .998; 
Durbin-Watson = 1.90
Equation (15): CR2 = .98;  
Durbin-Watson = 1.08
b. Estimation of Real Wage and Labor
Productivity Equations as a Nonlinear
System with Constrained Coefficients,
Adjusted for Business Cycle Effects
Coefficient Standard Error
g0 = 0.528* (.17)
g1 = 0.67* (.09)
g2 = 0.0001 (.0009)
g3 = –0.32* (.08)
g4 = 0.22* (.06)
m0 = –6.12* (.11)
m1 = 0.002* (.0008)
m2 = 0.21* (.04)
m3 = 0.24* (.03)
Equation (14a): CR2 = .998; 
Durbin-Watson = 1.90
Equation (15a): CR2 = .96;  
Durbin-Watson = 0.79
*   = .01 level of significance.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992 and personal com-
munication); Citibase.
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Table B3
Long-Run Estimates of Real Wage and Labor Productivity Equations 
(log levels and D log levels)
Real Wage Equation (14) Productivity  Equation (15)
Constant 3.36* Constant –6.07*
(.34)
(.23)
(n – ka) –.44* (n – ka) .24*
(.10)
(.075)
(g - ka) .28* (g – ka) .29*
(.09)
(.07)
D real wage(2) –.41* D (y – ka)(2) .25*
(.09)
(.09)
D real wage(1) –.66* D (y – ka)(1) –.61*
(.08)
(.09)
D (n – ka)(2) –.18***
(.11)
D (g – ka)(2) –.04*** D (g – ka)(2) .25*
(.02) (.10)
D (g – ka)(1) –.05*** D(g – ka)(–1) .26*
(.03) (.06)
D rho .95* D rho .91*
(.004) (.04)
CR2 = .998 CR2 = .996
Durbin-Watson = 1.30 Durbin-Watson =  .68
Standard errors in parentheses.
*   = .01 level of significance.
**  = .05 level of significance.
*** = .10 level of significance.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in Bureau of Economic Analysis (1992 and personal com-
munication); Citibase.
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(14) ( wt - pt) = g0 + g1( wt - pt)t-1 + g2t + g3 ( nt - kt) 
+ g4 (gt - kt) + g5cut + ht
(15) ( yt - kt) = m0 + m1 t + m2(n1 -  k1) + m3(g1-  k1) 
+ m4cut +e2
The real wage as specified as in equation (14) is similar to
Canzoneri’s specification (Canzoneri 1978). However, equation (14)
not only controls for the private capital stock (Canzoneri’s term nt -
kt) while allowing for the identification of the effects of diminishing
returns to labor, but also allows for the identification of the separate
effects of public capital (g – k). If public capital raises aggregate pro-
d u c t i v i t y, then a direct relationship between the real wage and the
public capital term would be found. 
C o u n t e rcyclical wage movements were modeled as changes in the
labor productivity variable. For simplicity, time was used as a proxy
for technological change not captured in the capital stock.8
Procyclical wage movements were modeled as changes in capital uti-
lization.9 Entering capacity utilization as a separate variable incorpo-
rates the effect of variation in capital stock utilization over the busi-
ness cycle.1 0 H o w e v e r, since changes in capacity utilization also
change the utilization of the capital stock, another way to measure
the effect of the business cycle is to adjust the capital stock for actual
capital employed. This adjustment was made by multiplying the capi-
tal stock by the capacity utilization rate, thereby indicating that the
flow of capital services—and there f o re the amount of capital stock
per worker—changes over the business cycle.11 Equations (14a) and
(15a) below incorporate the concept of the capital stock adjusted for
capacity utilization (ka)
(14a) ( wt - pt) = g0 + g1( wt - pt)t-1 + g2t + g3 ( nt - k at) 
+ g4 (gt - kat) + ht
(15a) (yt - kat) = m0 + m1t + m2(nt - kat) + m3(gt - kat)  + et
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1. Tatom (1991) found no statistical correlation between infrastructure spend-
ing and economic growth, and Holtz-Eakin (1993), in a state-specific
approach, found no productivity gains to justify the spending of “scarce eco-
nomic resources” on public infrastructure.
2. Spurious correlation, a problem that occurs when time series data are used,
arises when an independent variable is found to be significant (statistically
different from zero), implying that there is a relationship between the
dependent and independent variables even when no relationship exists.
3. Point elasticity estimates measure 0.35 and 0.39, respectively. Estimates
made excluding public capital reveal problems with serial correlation, unex-
pected signs, and statistical insignificance.
4. See also Shah (1992) who examines the relationship between public infra-
structure and productivity in Mexico.
5. To address concerns about stationarity, estimates were taken from the pro-
ductivity equation that establish a long-run relationship between produc-
tivity (measured as output per unit of capital) and the employment-to-capi-
tal ratio and the public capital–to–private capital ratio. 
6. See Hulten and Schwab (1990) and Nadiri and Mamuneas (1991).
7. Other interest rate variables were used (including the real rate alone and
the ratio of sales to the real rate); none of these variables performed well.
8. The idea that technology is embodied in the capital stock is argued by
Richard R. Nelson (1973).
9. According to Merrick (1984), variation in capital utilization shifts the
marginal product of labor.
10. This technique was employed by Aschauer (1989a) and Erenburg (1993a).
11. See, for example, Tatom (1991).
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